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Abstract
Regular annuities provide payment for the duration of an owners life-
time. Period-Certain annuities provide additional payment after death to a
designated beneciary provided the insured dies within a certain period after
annuitization. It has been argued that the bequest option o¤ered by the latter
is dominated by life insurance which provides non-random bequests. This is
correct if competitive annuity suppliers have full information about individual
longevities and price annuities accordingly. In contrast, this paper shows that
when individual longevities are private information, a competitive pooling equi-
librium which o¤ers annuities at common prices to all individuals may have
positive amounts of both types of annuities in addition to life insurance. In
this equilibrium, individuals self-select the types of annuities that they pur-
chase according to their longevity prospects. The break-even price of each
type of annuity reects the average longevity of its buyers plus expected lump-
sum payouts in the case of period-certain annuities. The broad conclusion
that emerges from this paper is that adverse-selection due to asymmetric in-
formation is reected not only in the amounts of insurance purchased but,
importantly, also in the choice of insurance products suitable for di¤erent indi-
vidual characteristics. This conclusion is supported by recent empirical work
about the UK annuity market (Finkelstein and Poterba (2004)).
JEL Classication: D-11, D-82
Key Words: Regular Annuities, Full Information Equilibrium, Period-
Certain Annuities, Pooling Equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Regular annuities (sometimes called life-annuities) provide payouts, xed or
variable, for the duration of the owners lifetime. No payments are made af-
ter the death of the annuitant. There are also period-certain annuities which
provide additional payments after death to a beneciary in the event that the
insured individual dies within a specied period after annuitization1. Ten-year
and Twenty-year certain periods are common (see Brown, Mitchell, Poterba
and Warshawsky (2001)). Of course, expected benets during life plus ex-
pected payments after death are adjusted to make the price of period-certain
annuities commensurate with the price of regular annuities.
Period-certain annuities thus provide a bequest option not o¤ered by reg-
ular annuities. It has been argued (e.g. Davido¤, Brown and Diamond (2005))
that a superior policy for risk-averse individuals who have a bequest motive is
to purchase regular annuities and a life insurance policy. The latter provides
a certain amount upon death, while the amount provided by period-certain
annuities is random, depending on the time of death.
In a competitive market for annuities with full information about longevi-
ties, annuity prices will vary with annuitants life expectancies. Such sepa-
rating equilibrium in the annuity market, together with a competitive market
for life insurance ensures that any combination of period-certain annuities and
life insurance is dominated by some combination of regular annuities and life-
insurance.
The situation is di¤erent, however, when individual longevities are private
information which cannot be revealed by individualschoices and hence each
type of annuities is sold at a common price available to all potential buyers.
This is called a pooling equilibrium. In this case, the equilibrium price of each
type of annuity is equal to the average longevity of the buyers of this type of
annuity, weighted by the equilibrium amounts purchased. Consequently, these
prices are higher than the average expected lifetime of the buyers, reecting
the adverse-selection caused by the larger amounts of annuities purchased by
individuals with higher longevities2.
1TIAA-CREF, for example, calls these After-Tax-Retirement-Annuities (ATRA) with
Death Benets.
2It is assumed that the amount of annuities purchased, presumably from di¤erent rms,
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When regular annuities and period-certain annuities are available in the
market, self-selection by individuals tends to segment annuity purchasers into
di¤erent groups. Those with relatively short expected life span and a high prob-
ability of early death after annuitization will purchase period-certain annuities
(and life insurance). Those with a high life expectancy and a low probability of
early death will purchase regular annuities (and life-insurance) and those with
intermediate longevity prospects will hold both types of annuities.
The theoretical implications of our modelling are supported by recent em-
pirical ndings reported in Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004), who studied
the UK annuity market. In a pioneering paper (2004), they test two hypothe-
ses. One, "that higher-risk individuals self-select into insurance contracts that
o¤er features that, at a given price, are most valuable to them". The second
is that "the equilibrium pricing of insurance policies reects variation in the
risk pool across di¤erent policies". They nd that the UK data supports both
hypotheses.
Our modelling provides a theoretical underpinning for this observation:
adverse selection in insurance markets may be revealed by self-selection of
di¤erent insurance instruments, in addition to varying amounts of insurance
purchased.
2 First-Best Consumption and Bequests
Consider individuals on the verge of retirement who face an uncertain lifetime.
They derive utility from consumption and from leaving bequests after death.
For simplicity, it is assumed that utilities are separable and independent of
age. Denote the instantaneous utility from consumption by u(a); where a is
the ow of consumption, and v(b) is the utility from bequests whose level is b.
The functions u(a) and v(b) are assumed to be strictly concave, di¤erentiable,
and satisfy u0(0) = v0(0) = 1 and u0(1) = v0(1) = 0: These assumptions
ensure that individuals will choose strictly positive levels of both a and b:
Assuming no time preference and a constant ow of consumption while
alive, lifetime utility, U , is
U = u(a)z + v(b) (1)
cannot be monitored. Hence, we consider only linear price policies (e.g. no quantity con-
straints). See, for example, Abel (1986) and Brugiavini (1993).
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where z is expected lifetime. Individuals have di¤erent longevities represented
by a parameter , z = z(): An individual with z() is termed type .
Assume that  varies continuously, with a distribution function G() over
the interval [; ];  > : We take a higher  to indicate lower longevity:
z0() < 03:
Social welfare, W , is the sum of realized individual utilities (or ex-ante
expected utility),
W =
Z

[u(a())z() + v(b())]dG() (2)
where (a(); b()) is consumption and bequests, respectively, of type  indi-
viduals.
Assume a zero rate of interest, so resources can be carried forward or
backward in time at no cost. Hence, given total resources, R, the economys
resource constraint is
Z

[a()z() + b()]dG() = R (3)
Maximization of (2) s.t. (3) yields a unique First-Best allocation, (a; b);
independent of ; which equalizes the marginal utilities of consumption and
bequests:
u0(a) = v0(b) (4)
Conditions (3) and (4) jointly determine (a; b) and the corresponding
optimum utility of type  individuals U() = u(a)z() + v(b): Note that
while First-Best consumption and bequests are equalized across individuals
with di¤erent longevities, U increases with longevity: U0() = u(a)z0() <
0:
3Let F (z; ) be probability that an individual survives to age z; 0  z  T; where T
is maximum lifetime. F (0; ) = 1;
@F (z; )
@z
< 0; z 2 (0; T ); and F (T; ) = 0; for all
 2 [; ]: Life expectancy of type  is z() =
TR
0
F (z; )dz: It is assumed that z() is nite
when T =1: An increase in  is taken to reduce survival probabilities, @F (z; )
@
< 0 for all
z; and hence z0() < 0:
Example: F (z; ) =
e z   e T
1  e T ; which becomes F (z; ) = e
 z when T =1:
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3 Competitive Equilibrium with Regular An-
nuities
In a market setting, consumption is nanced by annuities (for later reference
these are called regular annuities) while bequests are provided by the pur-
chase of life insurance. Each annuity pays a ow of one unit of consumption,
contingent on the annuity holders survival. Denote the price of annuities by
pa: A unit of life insurance pays upon death one unit for bequests and its price
is denoted by pb:
Each individual maximizes utility, (1), subject to the budget constraint
paa+ pbb = R (5)
where R is a given income4.
(a) Full Information Equilibrium
Under full information about individuals longevities, the competitive
equilibrium price of an annuity is equal to life expectancy of the purchaser:
pa = pa() = z()
5: Since each unit of life insurance pays one unit with cer-
tainty, its equilibrium price is unity: pb = 1: This competitive equilibrium
is e¢ cient, satisfying condition (4), and for a particular income distribution
yields the First-Best allocation6.
4Allowing for di¤erent incomes is important for welfare analysis. The joint distribution
of incomes and longevity is essential, for example, when considering tax/subsidy policies.
Our focus, though, is on the possibility of pooling equilibria with di¤erent types of annuities,
given any income distribution. For simplicity, we assume below equal incomes.
5The modication for a positive interest rate,  > 0; is straightforward. For exam-
ple, with F (z; ) = e z; z() =
1

: The present discounted value of expected payouts is
1R
0
e zF (z; )dz =
1
+ 
: Similarly, the price of a unit of life insurance is
1R
0
e zf(z; )dz =

+ 
; which is equal to 1 when  = 0:
6Individuals who maximize (1) s.t. the budget constraint z()a + b = R() will select
(a; b) i¤ R() = R + (1   )b; where  = () = z()
R

z()dG()
> 0: Note that R()
strictly decreases with  (increases with life expectancy).
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(b) Pooling Equilibrium
Suppose that longevity is private information and hence annuities are sold
at the same price, pa; to all individuals. Life insurance is sold at the common
price pb:
Maximization of (1) s.t. (5) yields demand functions for annuities, a^(pa; pb;);
and for life insurance, b^(pa; pb;)7: Given our assumptions,
@a^
@pa
< 0;
@a^
@
< 0;
@a^
@pb
R 0; @b^
@pb
< 0;
@b^
@
> 0;
@b^
@pa
R 0:
Total prots from the sale of annuities, a, and from the sale of life insur-
ance, b, are:
a(pa; pb) =
Z

(pa   z())a^(pa; pb;)dG() (6)
and
b(pa; pb) =
Z

(pb   1)b^(pa; pb;)dG() (7)
Denition 1 A pooling equilibrium is a pair of prices (p^a; p^b) that satisfy
a(p^a; p^b) = b(p^a; p^b) = 0:
Clearly, p^b = 1; because marginal costs of a life insurance policy are con-
stant and equal to 1. From (6), the zero prots condition for annuities is
p^a =
R

z()a^(p^a; 1;)dG()
R

a^(p^a; 1;)dG()
: (8)
The equilibrium price of annuities is seen to be an average of marginal costs
(equal to life expectancy), weighted by the equilibrium amounts of annuities:
z() < p^a < z():
Furthermore, since a^ and z() decrease with ; it follows from (8) that
p^a > E(z) =
R

z()dG(): The equilibrium price of annuities is higher than
7The dependence on R is suppressed.
6
the populations average expected lifetime, reecting the adverse-selection
present in a pooling equilibrium.
Regarding price dynamics out of equilibrium, we follow the standard as-
sumption (reecting entry and exit of rms) that the price of each good changes
in opposite direction to the sign of prots from sales of this good. It is well-
known that a su¢ cient condition for (p^a; 1) to be unique and (locally) stable
is that the matrix 2664
@a
@pa
@a
@pb
@b
@pa
@b
@pb
3775 ; (9)
be positive denite at (p^a; 1): Appendix A provides a su¢ cient condition for
(9) to be positive-denite.
4 Regular and Period-Certain Annuities: First-
Best and Full Information Equilibrium
We have assumed that annuities provide payouts for the duration of the owners
lifetime and no payments are made after death of the annuitant. We called
these regular annuities. There exist also period-certain annuities which provide
an additional payment to a designated beneciary after death of the insured
person, provided death occurs within a specied period after annuitization8.
Ten-year and Twenty-year certain periods are common and more annuitants
choose them over regular annuities (see Brown, Mitchell, Poterba and War-
shawsky (2001)). Of course, benets during life plus expected payments after
death are adjusted to make the price of period-certain annuities commensurate
with the price of regular annuities.
Suppose that there are regular annuities and X-year-certain annuities (in
short, X-annuities) who o¤er a unit ow of consumption while alive and an
additional lump-sum equal to the total amount that would be paid if the holder
were alive until age x. Thus, if the holder dies at age z, 0  z  x; the payout
upon death per X-annuity is equal to x z. We continue to denote the amount
of regular annuities by a and denote the amount of X-annuities by ax:
8TIAA-CREF, for example, calls these After-Tax-Retirement Annuities (ATRA) with
death benets.
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(a) First-Best
The First-Best allocation with both types of annuities is obtained by max-
imization of social welfare
W =
Z

[u(a() + ax())z() +
xZ
0
v(b() + (x  z)ax())f(z; )dz +
+v(b())
1Z
x
f(z; )dz]dG() (10)
Subject to the resource constraint
Z

[(a() + ax())z() + ax()
xZ
0
(x  z)f(z; )dz + b()]dG() = R (11)
where f(z; ) is the probability that type  dies at age z:
xR
0
f(z; )dz +
R
x
f(z; )dz = 19:
Maximization of (10) s.t. (11) yields solutions a; ax and b
: It is straight-
forward to verify that ax = 0 for all     ; while a and b are positive,
satisfying the e¢ ciency condition (4), and are independent of : This is an
important conclusion:
The First-Best has no X-annuities: the random bequest option o¤ered by
X-annuities is dominated by regular annuities and life insurance which jointly
provide for non-random consumption and bequests.
We shall now show that a full-information competitive equilibrium also
has no X-annuities10.
(b) Full-information Equilibrium
Continue to denote the price of regular annuities by pa, and denote the
price of X-annuities by pxa: Type  individuals maximize their expected utility,
9The probability of death at age z is f(z; ) =
@
@z
(1 F (z; )) =  @F
@z
(z; ): For example,
for F (z; ) = e z; f(z; ) = e z; z  0:
10While the competitive equilibrium is e¢ cient, the equilibrium amounts of a and b need
not be equal to a and b as they depend on the income distribution.
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U();
U() = u(a+ ax)z() +
xZ
0
v(b+ (x  z)ax)f(z; )dz +
+v(b)
1Z
x
f(z; )dz (12)
subject to the budget constraint
paa+ p
x
a ax + b = R: (13)
The F.O.C. are
u0(a+ ax)z()  pa  0 (14)
u0(a+ ax)z() +
xZ
0
v0(b+ (x  z)ax)(x  z)f(z; )dz   pxa  0 (15)
and
xZ
0
v0(b+ (x  z)ax)f(z; )dz + v0(b)
1Z
x
f(z; )dz    = 0 (16)
with  > 0 being the Lagrangean associated with the budget constraint (13).
Denote the solution to (13) - (16) by a^; a^x; ^ and b^, all functions of pa; pxa and
 (dependence on x and R is supressed)11.
Suppose that individual characteristics, z() and f(z; ); are known to
the sellers of annuities. Then, zero expected prots for each  entails that
pa = z() and pxa = z() +
xZ
0
(x  z)f(z; )dz (17)
Prices vary with individual longevities: for each ; the price of regular
annuities is equal to life expectancy and that of X-annuities exceeds it by the
expected lump-sum payment after death.
11The assumption that v0(0) = 1 ensures that b^ > 0 and hence (16) holds with equality.
Note also that assumption that u0(0) = 1 ensures that a^ and a^x cannot both be equal to
zero.
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We can now state:
Proposition 1 Under (17), a^x = 0; a^ > 0 and b^ > 0 for all  2 [; ]:
Proof Appendix B.
Proposition 1 has a stark conclusion: a competitive annuity market which
recognizes and bases annuity prices on individual longevity characteristics has
no X-annuities. In contrast, we shall show that X-annuities may be held in
a pooling equilibrium in which prices do not vary with individual longevities
because these are private information. Self-selection leads to a segmented mar-
ket equilibrium: individuals with low longevities and high probability of early
death purchase X-annuities (and life-insurance), while individuals with high
longevities and low probability of early death purchase regular annuities (and
life-insurance). In a range of intermediate longevities individuals hold both
types of annuities.
5 Pooling Equilibrium
When  is private information, all individuals face the same prices, pa and
pxa: In a competitive equilibrium, these prices satisfy a zero expected prots
condition for each type of annuity, based on the quantities purchased. Denote
these equilibrium prices by p^a and p^xa (p^b = 1):
The zero expected prots conditions for regular and X-annuities, a(p^a; p^xa; 1) =
xa(p^a; p^
x
a; 1) = 0 (b(pa; p
x
a; 1) = 0 for any (pa; p
x
a)) can be written (sup-
pressing p^b = 1)
p^a =
R

z()a^(p^a; p^
x
a;)dG()
R

a^(p^a; p^xa;)dG()
(18)
and
p^xa =
R


z() +
xR
0
(x  z)f(z; )dz

a^x(p^a; p^
x
a;)dG()
R

a^(p^a; p^xa;)dG()
(19)
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As before, the equilibrium price of regular annuities is equal to the weighted
average expected lifetime in the population, with the quantities of regular annu-
ities purchased as weights. The equilibrium price of X-annuities is a weighted
average of life expectancy in the population plus the average expected payout
upon death, weights being the amounts purchased of X-annuities.
Conditions for uniqueness and stability of p^a; p^xa and p^b can be formu-
lated along the lines in Appendix A which deals with regular annuities and life
insurance12.
We shall now explore the possible equilibrium congurations implied by
(13-16):
I. a^ > 0; a^x = 0
Condition (14) holds with equality. From (14) - (16) it now follows that:
pxa  pa +
xZ
0
(x  z)f(z; )dz (20)
Risk averse individuals do not purchase X-annuities when their price ex-
ceeds the price of regular annuities plus the expected payout upon death.
We assume that
@f(z; )
@
> 0; 0  z  x (21)
A decrease in longevity increases the probability of death at all ages be-
tween 0 and x. Suppose that there exists an 0 2 [; ]; which makes (15)
hold with equality: pxa   pa =
xR
0
(x   z)f(z; 0)dz: It is seen that (19) ensures
that (15) holds with strict inequality for all  2 [; 0]; implying that all indi-
viduals with high longevities (z()  z(0); that is,   0) hold only regular
annuities (and life insurance).
Also, holding prices constant,
da^
d
< 0 and
db^
d
> 0 for     0:
The holding of annuities increases and of life insurance decreases with life
expectancy.
12These conditions ensure that the matrix of the partial derivatives of expected prots
w.r.t. pa; pxa and pb is positive denite around p^a; p^
x
a and p^b = 1:
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II. a^ > 0; a^x > 0
Conditions (14) and (15) hold with equality.
From (14) - (16) we deduce that
pxa = pa +
xZ
0
v0(b^+ (x  z)a^x)

(x  z)f(z; )dz (22)
The price of X-annuities exceeds the price of regular annuities by the
expected payout of X-annuities upon death weighted by the marginal utility
of bequests (including the payout) divided by the marginal utility of income.
This implies that
pxa   pa <
v0(b^)

xZ
0
(x  z)f(z; )dz (23)
The di¤erence in the price of X-annuities and regular annuities is smaller
than the expected bequest viaX-annuities tines the marginal utility of bequests
via life insurance divided by the marginal utility of income. Inequality (23)
reects risk aversion regarding the uncertainty of bequests via X-annuities.
In Appendix C we prove that second-order conditions are satised in this
range of s.
III. a^ = 0; a^x > 0
Condition (15) holds with equality. If there exists an 1 <  such that
u0(a^x)z(1) = pa; then for  2 [1; ]; (14) holds (with a^ = 0).
Again, it is shown in Appendix C that the second-order conditions hold
in this range of , and
da^x
d
< 0;
db^
d
> 0:
We can now portray the generic pattern of annuity and life insurance
holdings for various life expectancies (Figure 1).
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Figure 1
Optimum Annuity Holdings
6 A Simple Example
The fundamental reason why regular and X-annuities may coexist in the mar-
ket is asymmetric information about individual longevities. This leads to an-
nuity prices which yield zero expected prots given the longevity parameters
of the purchasers of each type of annuities. To underscore this point consider
a simple example. Suppose that each X-annuity provides a certain amount,
 > 0; in case of early death13. Consider two individuals with life expectancies
zi; i = 1; 2; and let z1 > z2: The probabilities of early death are, correspond-
ingly, pi; 0  pi  1; i = 1; 2; with p1 < p2:
Each individual maximizes expected utility, Ui,
Ui = u(ai + a
i
x)zi + v(bi + a
i
x)pi + v(bi)(1  pi); i = 1; 2 (24)
subject to the budget constraint
paai + p
x
aa
i
x + bi = R (25)
13Thus, to simplify the calculations, death within [0; x] is shrunk to a point.
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We look for parameter congurations, z1; z2 and ; that lead individual 1
to purchase in equilibrium only regular annuities and individual 2 to purchase
onlyX-annuities. Explicit solutions are obtained when u and v are logarithmic:
u() = v() = ln(): With ax1 = 0; individual 1s demands for annuities and life
insurance, (a^1; b^1); are
a^1 =
z1R
pa(1 + z1)
; b^1 =
R
1 + z1
(26)
The condition for this individual not to purchase X-annuities is that the
marginal utility of one unit of an X-annuity at (a^1; b^1) be lower than the
marginal utility of income times pxa :
z1
a^1
+
p1
b^1
+
1  p1
b^1
 1pxa; where 1; is
the marginal utility of income.
When the market is segmented, individual 1 purchasing only regular an-
nuities and individual 2 only X-annuities, the equilibrium prices are: p^a = z1;
p^xa = z2 + p2: Hence, 1 =
1
b^1
and a^1 = b^1: Consequently, the condition for
individual 1 not to purchase any X-annuities is
z1 + p1  z2 + p2
or
z1   z2  (p2   p1): (27)
When a^2 = 0; the demands of individual 2 for X-annuities and life in-
surance at the equilibrium price p^xa = z2 + p2 (and p^b = 1), are implicitly
determined by the following conditions:
z2
a^2x
+
p2
b^2 + a^2x
  2(z2 + p2) = 0 (28)
p2
b^2 + a^2x
+
1  p2
b^2
  2 = 0 (29)
and the budget constraint (25). Substituting (25) and (29) into (28), the
condition that determines a^2x can be written
z2
a^2x
+
p2
W   [z2   (1  p2)]a^2x
=
= (z2 + p2)

p2
W   [z2   (1  p2)]a^2x
+
1  p2
W   (z2 + p2)a^2x
 (30)
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It can be shown (see Figure 2) that (30) determines a unique a^2x

<
R
z2 + p2

:
Figure 2
The condition that individual 2 does not purchase regular annuities is
that, at (a^2x; b^2); the marginal utility of regular annuities is lower than the
marginal utility of income 2; times p^a = z1 :
z2
a^2x
  2z1  0 (31)
It is easy to see that there are many parameter values, z1; z2; p1; p2 and  which
satisfy conditions (27) and (31). In particular, when p2  1; then a^2x 
R
1 + z2
and 2  1
R  z2a^2x
: Condition (27) is approximately z1   z2  (1  p1) while
(31) reduces to z2 < z1; which holds by assumption.
7 Summary:
In e¢ cient full-information equilibria, the holdings of any period-certain annu-
ities and life insurance is dominated by the holdings of some combination of
15
regular annuities and life insurance. However, when information about longevi-
ties is private, a competitive pooling equilibrium may support the coexistence
of di¤erentiated annuities and life insurance, with some individuals holding
only one type of annuity and some holding both types of annuities.
Reassuringly, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) nd evidence of such self-
selection in the UK annuity market. More specically, our analysis suggests
a hypothesis complementary to their observation of self-selection: those with
high longevities hold regular annuities, while those with low longevities hold
period-certain annuities, with mixed holdings for intermediate longevities.
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Appendix A
Let "apa =
pa
a^(pa; pb;)
@a^(p^a; pb;)
@pa
be the own price elasticity of the de-
mand for annuities. We shall prove that a monotonicity assumption about
su¢ ces for (9) to be positive-denite at (p^a; 1):
From (6) and (7), a(p^a; 1) = ^b(p^a; 1) = 0; we have
@b
@pa
= 0;
@b
@pb
=
b^(p^a; 1) > 0;
@a
@pa
= a^(p^a; 1) +
R

(p^a   z())@a^(p^a; 1;)
@pa
dG() R 0 and @a
@pb
=
R

(p^a   z())@a^(p^a; 1;)
@pb
dG() R 0; where a^(p^a; 1) =
R

a^(p^a; 1;)dG() and
b^(p^a; 1) =
R

b^(p^a; 1;)dG() are aggregate demands. It is seen that a su¢ cient
condition for (9) to be positive denite at (p^a; 1) is that
@a
@pa
> 0:
Rewriting the second term in
@a
@pa
;
R

(p^a   z())a^(p^a; 1;)dG() =
=
1
p^a
R

(p^a   z())a^(p^a; 1;)"apa(p^a; 1;)dG()
(A.1)
By (6), p^a z() change sign once over [; ]; say at ~: That is p^a z() Q
0 as  Q ~:
Assume that "apa non-decreases in : Since p^a   z() change sign once
over [; ]; say at ~; this assumption and (8) lead to the following:
R

(p^a   z())a^(p^a; 1;)dG() 
 "apa(p^a; 1; ~)
p^a
R

(p^a   z())a^(p^a; 1;)dG() = 0
(A.2)
(A.2) ensures that
@a
@pa
> 0; implying that (9) is positive-denite.
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Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that a^x > 0; so that (15) holds with equality. If a^ > 0; then (14)
also holds with equality and, from (17) and (14) - (16), we have
1

xZ
0
v0(b^+ (x  z)a^x)(x  z)f(z; )dz =
xZ
0
(x  z)f(z; )dz
or
xZ
0
'(z; )(x  z)f(z; )dz = 0 (B.1)
where '(z; ) =
v0(b^+ xa^x)

  1:
By (16), '(x; ) =
v0(b^+ xa^x)

  1 < 0; '(0; ) = v
0(b^)

  1 > 0; and
'(z; ) is seen to change sign once over [; ]: Let '(~z) = 0: Then, '(z) Q 0
as z Q ~z: Since x  z decreases in z, it now follows from (B.1) that
xZ
0
'(z; )(x  z)f(z; )dz < (x  ~z)
xZ
0
'(z; )f(z; )dz (B.2)
Using
xR
0
f(z; )dz +
R
x
f(z; )dz = 1; we have
xZ
0
'(z; )f(z; )dz =
1

Z
x
f(z; )dz
24 xZ
0
v0(b^+ (x  z)a^x)f(z; )dz 
 v0(b^)

< 0: (B.3)
It follows from (B.2) and (B.3) that (B.1) cannot hold.
When a^ = 0; it follows from (14) and (15) that
xZ
0
v0(b^+ (x  z)a^x)(x  z)f(z; )dz 
xZ
0
(x  z)f(z; )dz (B.4)
which, by (B.1) - (B.3) has been shown to be impossible. We conclude that a^x
cannot be positive k :
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Appendix C
Here we prove that the second-order conditions for (13) - (16) are satised
and derive the dependence of the demands for annuities and life insurance on
: Maximizing (12) s.t. the budget constraint (13), yields solutions a^; a^x and
b^. Given our assumption that v0(0) =1; b^ > 0 for all  and hence (16) holds
with equality for all  2 [; ]:
We distinguish three regions: I. a^ > 0; a^x = 0; II. a^ > 0; a^x > 0 and III.
a^ = 0; a^x > 0:
I. a^ > 0; a^x = 0 ( <  < 0)
The conditions that determine a^(p^a; p^xa;) and b^(p^a; p^
x
a;) are
u0(a^)z()  pa = 0 (C.1)
v0(b^)   = 0 (C.2)
W   paa^  b^ = 0 (C.3)
where  > 0 is the marginal utility of income.
The second-order conditions are u00(a^)z() < 0; v00(b^) < 0; and
1 =  (u00(a^)z() + p2av00(b^)) > 0 (C.4)
are satised.
Di¤erentiating (C.1) - (C.3) totally, holding prices constant,
da^
d
=
u0(a^)z0()
1
< 0;
db^
d
=
pau
0(a^)z0()
1
> 0 (C.5)
II. a^ > 0; a^x > 0
Conditions (14) - (15) hold with equality:
u0(a^+ a^x)z()  pa = 0 (C.6)
u0(a^+ a^x)z() +
xZ
0
v0(b^+ (x  z)a^x)f(z; )dz   pxa = 0 (C.7)
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xZ
0
v0(b^+ (x  z)a^x)f(z; )dz + v0(b^)
1Z
x
f(z; )dz    = 0 (C.8)
W   paa^  pxaa^x   b^ = 0 (C.9)
The second-order conditions are that the matrix (we ommit the terms in
the functions):26666664
u00z u00z 0  pa
u00z u00z +
xR
0
v00(x  z)2fdz
xR
0
v00(x  z)fdz  pxa
0
xR
0
v00(x  z)
xR
0
v00fdz + v00(b^)
1R
x
fdz  1
 pa  pxa  1 0
37777775 (C.10)
is negative denite. The signs of the principal minors of (C.10) alternate:
u00z < 0 (C.11)
u00z
xZ
0
v00(x  z)2fdz > 0 (C.12)
u00z
240@ xZ
0
v00(x  z)2fdz
1A0@ xZ
0
v00fdz + v00(b^)
1Z
x
fdz
1A 
0@ xZ
0
v00(x  z)fdz
1A235 < 0
(C.13)
and (after some manipulations)
2 = u
00z

xR
0
v00(x  z   (pxa   pa))2fdz + (pxa   pa)2

xR
0
v00fdz + v00(b^)
1R
x
fdz

+p2a
"
xR
0
v00(x  z)
2
 
xR
0
v00(x  z)2fdz

xR
0
v00fdz + v00(b^)
1R
x
fdz
#
< 0
(C.14)
To prove (C.13), rewrite the term in square brackets,0@ xZ
0
v00(x  z)fdz
1A0@ xZ
0
v00fdz + v00(b^)
1Z
x
fdz
1A xZ
0
'(z)(x  z)fdz (C.15)
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where
'(z) =
v00(x  z)
xR
0
v00(x  z)fdz
  v
00
xR
0
v00fdz + v00(b^)
1R
x
fdz
(C.16)
Note that '(0) > 0; because the rst term is > 1 and the second < 1;
while '(x) < 0: Since '(z) changes sign once over [0; x], say at ~z, it follows
that
xZ
0
'(z)(x z)fdz > (x ~z)
xZ
0
2664 v00(x  z)fxR
0
v00(x  z)fdz
  v
00f
xR
0
v00fdz + v00(b^)
1R
x
fdz
3775 dz > 0:
This proves that (C.15) is positive, it also proves, by (C.14), that 2 < 0:
Using the rst-order conditions, one can calculate
2
db^
d
= pa
24pa
0@ xZ
0
v0
@f
@
dz + v0(b^)
1Z
x
@f
@
dz
1A3524 xZ
0
v00(x  z)2fdz   (pxa   pa)
xZ
0
v00(x  z)
35 
 
24 xZ
0
v00(x  z)@f
@
dz   (pxa   pa)
0@ xZ
0
v0
@f
@
dz + v0(b^)
1Z
x
@f
@
dz
1A35 

24(pxa   pa)u00z + p2a xZ
0
v00(x  z)fdz
35 (C.17)
In (C.17), the rst term in square brackets is positive, the third and fourth
are negative. We want to show that the second term is negative. Rewrite it,
using (20),
(pxa   pa)
xZ
0
v00(x  z)fdz
xZ
0
'(z)(x  z)dz (C.18)
where
'(z) =
v00(x  z)f
xR
0
v00(x  z)fdz
  v
0f
xR
0
v0fdz + v0(b^)
1R
x
fdz
; 0  z  x (C.19)
It is seen that '(0) > 0; '(x) < 0 and '(z) changes sign once over [0; x],
say at ~z: It follows that
xZ
0
'(z)(x  z)dz > (x  ~z)
xZ
0
'(z)dz = 1 
xR
0
v0fdz
xR
0
v0fdz + v0(b^)
1R
x
fdz
> 0 (C.20)
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Since 2 < 0; it follows that
db^
d
> 0:
From the budget constraint (18) it follows that pa
da^
d
+ pxa
da^x
d
< 0: Su¢ -
cient conditions for
da^
d
and
da^x
d
each to be negative can be formulated. They
concern the sign of the covariance between the changes in longevity,
df
d
; and
the marginal utility, v0(x  z); at di¤erent ages. We skip these conditions.
III. a^ = 0; a^x > 0
The equations that determine a^x(pxa;) and b^(p
x
a;) are now
u0(a^x)z() +
xZ
0
v0(b^+ (x  z)a^x)(x  z)f(z; )dz   pxa = 0 (C.21)
and
 pxaa^x   b^+W = 0 (C.22)
where
xZ
0
v0(b^+ (x  z)a^x)f(z; )dz + v0(b^)
xZ
0
f(z; )dz    = 0 (C.23)
The individual does not purchase regular annuities when
u0(a^x)z()  pa  0 (C.24)
The marginal utility of X-annuities decreases as their quantity increases
but so does the marginal utility of income, : A second-order condition for
(C.21) to be a maximum is that the former decreases faster:
u00(a^x)z+
xZ
0
v00(b^+(x z)a^x)(x z)2f(z; )dz pxa
xZ
0
v00(b^+(x z)a^x)(x z)f(z; )dz < 0
(C.25)
The other second-order condition
3 = u
00(a^x)z+
xZ
0
v00(b^+(x z)a^x)(x z pxa)2f(z; )dz+(pxa)2v0(b^)
1Z
x
f(z; )dz < 0
(C.26)
is seen to be satised.
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It is assumed that a decrease in life expectancy decreases the marginal
utility of lifetime consumption plus the marginal utility of bequests more than
the increase in the marginal utility of income.
From (C.21) - (C.23),
3
da^x
d
= u0(a^x)z0() +
xZ
0
v0(b^+ (x  z)a^x)(x  z)df(z; )
d
dz  
 pxa
0@ xZ
0
v0(b^+ (x  z)a^x)df(z; )
d
dz + v0(b^)
1Z
x
@f(z; )
@
dz
1A
(C.27)
Assume that the negative e¤ect of a decrease in life expectancy on the
consumption value of X-annuities, u0(a^x)z0(); dominates the increased value
of bequests and, consequently, the rise in the marginal utility of income. This
means that, in (C.27), the term in square brackets is negative and hence,
da^x
d
< 0 and
db^
d
> 0:
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